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- Thread starter Jaysen
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Didn't see the survey link as I was reading the article - thanks for sharing the link, Jaysen. Will have a go at predicting things to see if I'm right by the end of 2019.
- Feb 17, 2018
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Yep - no idea what's gonna happen but was quite fun to do!
Didn't see the survey link as I was reading the article - thanks for sharing the link, Jaysen. Will have a go at predicting things to see if I'm right by the end of 2019.
Good luck!
- Feb 17, 2018
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Mainly the big ongoing topics:
- Brexit
- US trade war with China
- Challenges facing high street
- Big tech regulation/growth
- Rising interest rates
- Rise of tech/AI
Tensions rise as US turns up heat on Brussels
By Alan Beattie (Financial Times)
January 14, 2019
Taking on Xi Jinping is one thing, but how does the US feel about going head-to-head with Jean-Claude Juncker?
Last week the US-China trade talks in Beijing (summary: a bit more optimistic than many expected, but still a long way to go) got all the headlines. Rather more quietly, in Washington, the latest iteration of EU-US peace talks took place between Cecilia Malmstrom, the EU trade commissioner, and US trade representative Robert Lighthizer.
A truce between the two trading giants, initially brokered in July last year between Mr Juncker, president of the European Commission, and US president Donald Trump to head off the threat of US tariffs on European car exports, has lasted remarkably long for a deal which so far has delivered essentially nothing of substance. Apart from Brussels’ promise to purchase more American soyabeans (meaningless given the EU’s unfortunate lack of centralised soft commodity procurement) and some warm words on buying liquefied natural gas, there were no immediate deliverables.
The proposed content comes in two parts, one of which is do-able but minimal and the other more substantive but politically harder. The minimal part is to extract and complete some of the conformity assessment and regulatory co-operation elements from the stalled Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) talks — such as on medical devices, pharmaceuticals and machinery, which will ease recognition of testing and even of rules themselves.
The serious one is the proposal for a zero-tariff deal covering all industrial products minus cars, which the commission in particular is desperate for people not to call a “mini-TTIP”. The problems with such a mini-TTIP were evident from the outset. By excluding all farm products and cars, it stretched to snapping point the World Trade Organization rule about such deals covering “substantially all the trade”. (In order not to provoke apoplexy in France, the commission has insisted agriculture is not on the table.) A mini-TTIP would also violate the EU’s principle about agreeing deals only with signatories to the Paris agreement on climate change, of which the US is not one.
The US seems disinclined to respect any EU sensitivities, as shown by the negotiating objectives for the deal that the US trade representative’s office released on Friday. Provocative demands included an agricultural section that called not just for eliminating tariffs but also dismantling non-tariff barriers to US farm exports. (This takes us back to the interminable disputes over chlorine-washed chicken that previously blew up transatlantic talks.) The proposals did at least say the US was prepared to take the talks with the EU in stages. But the US trade representative will have been aware of the explosive nature of these demands. If the US insists they are essential to a deal, the negotiations will be over before they start.
Distrust of the potential deal in some parts of Brussels has been growing since last summer, and the US negotiating objectives will probably exacerbate that. The scepticism of Bernd Lange, chair of the European Parliament’s international trade committee, has recently increased, including in an FT op-ed. Though he does not have the power to prevent negotiations starting, Mr Lange’s wishlist of preconditions includes a preliminary “scoping exercise” to delineate the areas to be discussed, and the US lifting steel and aluminium tariffs on EU exports. The commission last week announced it would seek a negotiating mandate from member states; it does not, however, seem to think a scoping exercise is necessary.
The commission’s attitude — exemplified by Ms Malmstrom in this video of an interview with the author in late November, relevant section from 09.41 onwards — tends towards the cautious, and emphasises the importance of process. The EU’s strategy is surely that the regulatory mini-deal by itself will keep the US happy enough for it to hold off the emergency car duties while taking the wider industrial tariffs talks slowly.
At the current rate of progress, Ms Malmstrom may not even be in charge of the EU side by the time any substantive talks on tariffs are finalised; there will be a new commission this autumn. But whether any kind of deal is even remotely possible may well become evident before then.
Holding China accountable
The US-China talks last week in Beijing were notable more for their emollient tone than for the substance of a breakthrough. But one issue that did clearly emerge was the need to hold China accountable for any promises it made on issues such as forced technology transfer. This is complicated by the fact that the US trade representative is averse to any dispute settlement mechanism that might give other governments a new avenue to bring legal actions against the US.
This is not a new problem, and has formed some of the most intractable conversations between China and the US since the former’s accession to the WTO. In the early years, when CDs and DVDs were a much bigger part of the entertainment market, the US would complain vociferously that while Chinese laws on intellectual property rights were often perfectly satisfactory, their implementation by local courts was not.
At some points, the US even contemplated setting numerical targets for China to convict counterfeiters. In the event, the issue became less important thanks to technological change. But the question of enforcing rules against hard-to-quantify violations of agreements has not gone away.
Figure of the week — $270,000
The calculated increase in profits earned by US steel companies for each new job created by the Trump steel tariffs.
By Alan Beattie (Financial Times)
January 14, 2019
Taking on Xi Jinping is one thing, but how does the US feel about going head-to-head with Jean-Claude Juncker?
Last week the US-China trade talks in Beijing (summary: a bit more optimistic than many expected, but still a long way to go) got all the headlines. Rather more quietly, in Washington, the latest iteration of EU-US peace talks took place between Cecilia Malmstrom, the EU trade commissioner, and US trade representative Robert Lighthizer.
A truce between the two trading giants, initially brokered in July last year between Mr Juncker, president of the European Commission, and US president Donald Trump to head off the threat of US tariffs on European car exports, has lasted remarkably long for a deal which so far has delivered essentially nothing of substance. Apart from Brussels’ promise to purchase more American soyabeans (meaningless given the EU’s unfortunate lack of centralised soft commodity procurement) and some warm words on buying liquefied natural gas, there were no immediate deliverables.
The proposed content comes in two parts, one of which is do-able but minimal and the other more substantive but politically harder. The minimal part is to extract and complete some of the conformity assessment and regulatory co-operation elements from the stalled Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) talks — such as on medical devices, pharmaceuticals and machinery, which will ease recognition of testing and even of rules themselves.
The serious one is the proposal for a zero-tariff deal covering all industrial products minus cars, which the commission in particular is desperate for people not to call a “mini-TTIP”. The problems with such a mini-TTIP were evident from the outset. By excluding all farm products and cars, it stretched to snapping point the World Trade Organization rule about such deals covering “substantially all the trade”. (In order not to provoke apoplexy in France, the commission has insisted agriculture is not on the table.) A mini-TTIP would also violate the EU’s principle about agreeing deals only with signatories to the Paris agreement on climate change, of which the US is not one.
The US seems disinclined to respect any EU sensitivities, as shown by the negotiating objectives for the deal that the US trade representative’s office released on Friday. Provocative demands included an agricultural section that called not just for eliminating tariffs but also dismantling non-tariff barriers to US farm exports. (This takes us back to the interminable disputes over chlorine-washed chicken that previously blew up transatlantic talks.) The proposals did at least say the US was prepared to take the talks with the EU in stages. But the US trade representative will have been aware of the explosive nature of these demands. If the US insists they are essential to a deal, the negotiations will be over before they start.
Distrust of the potential deal in some parts of Brussels has been growing since last summer, and the US negotiating objectives will probably exacerbate that. The scepticism of Bernd Lange, chair of the European Parliament’s international trade committee, has recently increased, including in an FT op-ed. Though he does not have the power to prevent negotiations starting, Mr Lange’s wishlist of preconditions includes a preliminary “scoping exercise” to delineate the areas to be discussed, and the US lifting steel and aluminium tariffs on EU exports. The commission last week announced it would seek a negotiating mandate from member states; it does not, however, seem to think a scoping exercise is necessary.
The commission’s attitude — exemplified by Ms Malmstrom in this video of an interview with the author in late November, relevant section from 09.41 onwards — tends towards the cautious, and emphasises the importance of process. The EU’s strategy is surely that the regulatory mini-deal by itself will keep the US happy enough for it to hold off the emergency car duties while taking the wider industrial tariffs talks slowly.
At the current rate of progress, Ms Malmstrom may not even be in charge of the EU side by the time any substantive talks on tariffs are finalised; there will be a new commission this autumn. But whether any kind of deal is even remotely possible may well become evident before then.
Holding China accountable
The US-China talks last week in Beijing were notable more for their emollient tone than for the substance of a breakthrough. But one issue that did clearly emerge was the need to hold China accountable for any promises it made on issues such as forced technology transfer. This is complicated by the fact that the US trade representative is averse to any dispute settlement mechanism that might give other governments a new avenue to bring legal actions against the US.
This is not a new problem, and has formed some of the most intractable conversations between China and the US since the former’s accession to the WTO. In the early years, when CDs and DVDs were a much bigger part of the entertainment market, the US would complain vociferously that while Chinese laws on intellectual property rights were often perfectly satisfactory, their implementation by local courts was not.
At some points, the US even contemplated setting numerical targets for China to convict counterfeiters. In the event, the issue became less important thanks to technological change. But the question of enforcing rules against hard-to-quantify violations of agreements has not gone away.
Figure of the week — $270,000
The calculated increase in profits earned by US steel companies for each new job created by the Trump steel tariffs.
- Feb 17, 2018
- 4,719
- 8,627
A good basic article on loan security: https://www.oceanfinance.co.uk/blog/what-is-loan-security-0-6238-0.htm
If you find the concept confusing, it really helps to start with the basics. You can then apply the same principles to larger contexts.
If you find the concept confusing, it really helps to start with the basics. You can then apply the same principles to larger contexts.
- Feb 17, 2018
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Pretty big shake up today: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-47530302
The UK's accounting regulator, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), is being scrapped. Its to be replaced by a regulator that will have greater powers.
The FRC has been heavily criticised recently for its poor attempts to regulate auditors, especially following the collapse of companies like BHS and Carillion.
The UK's accounting regulator, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), is being scrapped. Its to be replaced by a regulator that will have greater powers.
The FRC has been heavily criticised recently for its poor attempts to regulate auditors, especially following the collapse of companies like BHS and Carillion.
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