One section of the article mentions the view that
"after the last financial crisis [reforms] did not address some of the underlying causes, such as outsized bonuses that encourage excessive risk-taking by bank executives." I have to say that I'm inclined to agree. When I studied banking law at university, I think what shocked me the most is that a lot of reforms introduced since the 2008 crisis lack any real bite. Most are voluntary and the only pressure to comply comes from shareholders.
The almost $10bn in losses suffered by Credit Suisse on the Greensill fiasco alone allegedly resulted from executives and the chief risk officer overruling risk analysts on Grensill's risk rating mere months before its collapse. And while high profile dismissals and executive board changes make it seem like CS are taking the situation seriously, the bank is
reportedly considering letting clients foot the bill for their losses rather than compensating them. CS position is that the funds were only offered to investors who were well aware of the risks. Any litigation investors bring is probably going to argue the contrary, that they did not know the risks and possibly that the bank failed in their duty of care to provide them with accurate advice.
Without getting into it too much and likely boring everyone, case law demonstrates that the liability rule tends to favour banks. There generally is a heavy burden on clients to prove breach of any statutory, common law or fiduciary duties. Needless to say this is going to be one long ride for angry investors, and not one that seems likely to lead to a positive outcome.
Side note: A huge chunk of one my TC interviews included a lengthy discussion with the partners on a similar issue, so this is possibly something worth having an opinion on!